This article extends the idea of 'structured immediacy' by investigating methods that adversaries use to make the past relevant and consequential in conflicts. Our strategy was to revisit our analysis of political discourse immediately following the 9/11 attacks in the USA (Leudar et al., 2004; Leudar and Nekvapil, 2007) . We did this to document what the adversaries did as 'practical historians'. We found that they used two related methods. One was to situate contemporary events relative to historical antecedents, alongside other contextual particulars, and by doing this provide these events with history-contingent meanings. The other was to attempt to constrain historical understandings of the contemporary events in the future. We interpret the results using the concept of 'structured immediacy' that points to how context -historical and otherwise -enters immediate settings of talk as a source of meaning.
matic field configuration. 2 Gurwitsch argued that the here-and-now is not a part of the thematic field unless it is made relevant (Gurwitsch, 1964: 340-3) . Leudar and Sharrock, on the other hand, focus on how the thematic field and the here-and-now are integrated in settings through participants' activities. They wrote:
… every interaction takes place in a concrete environment but that environment can be understood under varied descriptions through being connected by participants to wider ranges of circumstances. Such circumstances range broadly and may include aspects of culture, institutions and personal histories of participants as well as the happenings that more immediately envelop activities. (Leudar et al., 2008b: 865) Here we investigate how participants enrich the here-and-now of action by connecting it to the past: what shared practices do they have available to historicize the settings of activities and what does such historicizing afford? Our general task is to document what participants in social interactions do as 'practicing historians' (see Garfinkel in Hill and Crittenden, 1968) .
Many years ago, R.G. Collingwood made a distinction between past and history. History was a science and what professional historians did. For Collingwood, being a historian was about understanding the actions of people in the past. This involved reenacting the thoughts that led to the actions which expressed them, and such a re-enactment required a wealth of circumstantial information. Collingwood insisted that professional historians should not wander through the past without direction but ask questions motivated by a search for explanations. His method was designed to uncover basic presuppositions characteristic of, and perhaps unique to, a historical period (Collingwood, 1940 (Collingwood, /2002 and see, for example, Connelly, 2009; Costall, 2009 ). To us, there are many attractive features in Collingwood's 'idea of history' (see Leudar, 2009 ) but it also seems as if for him everybody had a past, but only historians formulated history out of the past. Yet obviously even people not trained as historians write history, make history, think historically and act in settings which are, at least in part, accountably historical, and they do all these sorts of things methodically. Like professional historians, people investigate their past and express it in narratives, which are sometimes shared and sometimes contested.
There is a variety of contemporary social practices which depend on people having a sense of history: people embark on psychotherapies to uncover childhood traumas that might explain their problems as adults; they compose family genealogies that raise their self-worth; they write social histories to bring communities together (or to set them apart) and write autobiographies and thereby remain in the lives of others. Sometimes they just get together and talk about times and places that would otherwise be gone (see the articles in the special issue of Critical Discourse Studies, Wodak and Richardson, 2009) . We aim to document and analyse some of the ways people do history in everyday activities. This study complements our other investigations: we have also documented methods that psychoanalytical psychotherapists use to create psychotherapeutic settings (Leudar et al., 2008c) and have shown how generalized hostilities towards refugees structure their biographical narratives (Leudar et al., 2008a ). Here we shall be concerned specifically with how adversaries use and produce history in situations of conflict, and to what effect.
Human scientists' interest in lay histories is increasing. Much research has been concerned with how people understand their individual and communal past, how they chronicle their lives for posterity and what resources they have to do this (Miller, 2000; Martin, 2003; Martin and Wodak, 2003) . One approach to hand is the 'discourse-historical' version of critical discourse analysis (Wodak et al., 1990 (Wodak et al., , 1998 Heer et al., 2008) . Wodak and her colleagues stress that the past is represented in historical discourses which themselves have histories. This approach also stresses that there is usually not just one factually correct history, but histories which are not all born equal -one is usually a dominant version, and the others repressed (Wodak and Richardson, 2009: 231) . Heer et al. (2008) provide a potent example of this approach in documenting the historical accounts of the Wehrmacht's involvement in the Second World War, and of how this was whitewashed, repressed but brought back to public awareness through the concerted activity of activists. So the discourse-historical approach is inevitably also concerned with the functions histories play in social life (this is referred to as 'functionalizing' -see Charteris-Black, 2005; Wodak and Richardson, 2009) . Our own concern is less with the social history of historical narratives and their large-scale conflicts and more with how people make the past formulated as a history consequential in their local activities and produce it through those activities.
There is more than one way academics can think of people doing history. One is to analyse how people explicitly turn to the past: they represent it in narratives and chronicle their lives for posterity. In these respects, people can be said to act as 'lay historians': they do, in effect, what professional historians do, but not using the same methods as professionals nor the same criteria. But people do not just talk and write about the past. They also bring the past into their activities, by creating settings infused with history for those activities. In this respect, they are concurrently users and producers of histories. As history users, they relate contemporary activities to historical narratives available to a community and through doing this provide the activities with history-contingent meanings. This is our main interest -methods available to members to enrich the present by relating it to history. Our focus is therefore on history as one source of meaning. Understanding what one does is situated -it depends on settings that are created through what one has done, is doing or aims to do. The settings contain both retrospective and prospective local details (cf. Garfinkel et al., 1981) . And people do not do things just for contemporary reasons, but also because of past traumas, conflicts, loves, wars, atrocities, and they know this and say so. Once you have historicity, explicit in words such as 'biography', 'autobiography' and 'progress', you can't help using it in everyday life; and thinking historically makes a difference to the everyday lives of individuals and communities. History enriches our lives, whatever some philosophers may have argued (Popper, 1961) . 3 Many of our understandings of ourselves are historically situated in a further sense. For instance, we change and so do our understandings of ourselves and what we have done (Foucault, 1986; Hacking, 1995; Sharrock and Leudar, 2002; Leudar and Sharrock, 2003) . Such historical changes and contingencies are, moreover, not just facts beyond people's awareness, but something that can be explicitly built into their understandings and accounts. So we can orient to our individual and collective histories, and these can become an essential and explicit characteristic of how we understand ourselves and account for what we do.
It may be clear by now that we approach the problem of how in everyday life people create and use history as ethnomethodologists. The task for ethnomethodology in studying history is to document and analyse the methods of 'practical historians': how do participants formulate historical accounts in, through and for their activities? How do people connect their past to their practical activities in the present so that both the past and the present actions acquire meanings they may not have had otherwise? Historicity, conceived in this way, can be thought of as an aspect of the thematic field in the sense in which Aaron Gurwitsch (1964) introduced the term -contemporary activities acquire their meanings by being a figure in a field of particulars, some of which are historical; the question is how members of a community manage such 'historical indexicality'. 4 In this respect, our research on practical historians extends ethnomethodological investigations of how settings of activities are produced in and through activities and contribute to their meanings (Garfinkel, 1967: Ch. 1; Lynch, 1993) . In this article, we focus on how history is introduced into settings of political talk and becomes meaning-constitutive and so consequential.
In 1967, discussing indexicality in the first chapter of Studies in Ethnomethodology, Garfinkel used Husserl's ideas (as presented in Farber, 1943) to support his argument that references to biographies can be necessary in understanding members' actions. 5 Then in 1968, in Purdue Symposium on Ethnomethodology, Garfinkel analysed the work of 'practicing historians' such as inquest coroners whose work was to decide 'what happened' (suicide, murder or accident?). In the same symposium, Harvey Sacks argued that orientation to history had to be taken into account by anybody trying to understand the past, since the actors with historical sensibilities know that their actions might become a subject of historical scrutiny (Hill and Crittenden, 1968) . In 1981, Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, in their investigation of astronomers' work, documented the 'local historicity' of their practice 6 and noted the 'retro-prospective structures of local details' . This work indicated that 'local historicity' is a constitutive aspect of most activities. The problem is that, with rare exceptions, it has not been followed up. Ethnomethodologists do not seem at home working on history even though it is a members' term, and historicity of everyday activities is neglected as a research topic. 7 One exception is the work of Mike Lynch and David Bogen (Bogen and Lynch, 1989; Lynch and Bogen, 1996; . In The Spectacle of History (1996) , Lynch and Bogen analysed the Iran-contra inquiry and were concerned with how the conspirators acted as practical historians -how they anticipated scrutiny and acted so as to achieve 'plausible deniability'. Their argument was that the members' 'work of rendering history includes not only methods by which historical narratives are compiled and written, but, more importantly, methods by which a historical record was constituted in the first place' (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 61) . Their work created a space for studying the 'historicity' of actions. Yet this work has not been followed up either.
So in this article we try to revive the interest in practical historians -in how members produce history in and through their activities and use it. We specifically investigate how historical contingencies are built into and used in conflict. We revisit two of our own articles (Leudar et al., 2004; Leudar and Nekvapil, 2007) . Both analysed how the 9/11 attacks in the USA were represented. We re-analyse the same texts focusing on how the participants did history. The texts which we analyse were all part of a dialogical network described in these articles -they constitute a corpus on the basis of the relevancies displayed by the participants themselves rather than on the basis of our research agenda.
In this article, we also note the divergences between our original analysis and the present one. This procedure reveals not just the historicity of participants' understandings (which we originally neglected) but also some elements of the historical situatedness of the analysis itself. THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our 2.
very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The 3.
victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, 4.
military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives 5.
were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. 6.
The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures 7.
collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding 8.
anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and 9.
retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.
10.
A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake 11.
the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of 12.
America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American 13.
resolve. 14.
America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and 15.
opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. 16.
Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with 17.
the best of America -with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for 18.
strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could.
19.
Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency 20.
response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are 21.
working in New York City and Washington, D.C. to help with local rescue efforts. 22.
Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured, and to take every 23.
precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.
((four lines omitted)) 28.
The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full 29.
resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those 30.
responsible and to bring them to justice.
When we analysed this speech for the first time in 2003-4, we were interested in how the conduct of enemies was coordinated and so we focused on the 'us-them' aspects of the speech. Bush's account of the attacks, however, has features we did not note at the time. Many analysts noted that he explained the attacks by reference to intrinsic and permanent qualities of the perpetrators but did not relate them to relevant past conflicts (see, for example, Chomsky, 2001; Edwards, 2004; Chang and Mehan, 2006) . In terms of 'structured immediacy', the question is how does Bush situate the attacks? In Extract 1 the attacks are not formulated in local terms only, using relatively 'thin descriptions' 10 (as in lines 3-7) -their meaning is extended by introducing into settings the details of (i) attackers' motives (lines [8] [9] and (ii) victims' moral characteristics (lines [14] [15] . The acts themselves are described as 'deliberate' (line 2), 'deadly' (line 2), inimical of freedom (line 2), and 'acts of mass murder' (line 8). The characteristics of the perpetrators and victims are likewise not historicized -the former are implicit in the formulation of the attacks (the latter are asserted explicitly). The attack-relevant victim characteristics are expressed in a comparative -'the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world' -the qualities are thus not quite absolutes and the comparative situates the attacks broadly 'in the world' (since the relativized 'freedom' and 'opportunity' are the reason for the attacks). The properties of perpetrators, victims and attacks are therefore situated in extended settings but none are made historically contingent, nor are other explicit historical particulars introduced. So the attacks are made meaningful by including in settings those particulars that highlight comparative characteristics of perpetrators and victims -their 'evil' and their virtues, but none that point to relevant past conflicts.
In Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingstone's terms, Bush's speeches have contemporary and prospective 'local detail' but not retrospective. The prospective detail can be, however, historical in character -and here, all else equal, the attacks, as Bush formulates them, will constitute historical grounds for future retaliations: the perpetrators are being sought (lines 28-30) and when they are found they will be dealt with consistently with the formulation of the attacks in the past. The response will be justified and understood in terms of such a formulation. So, and this is important, some of the history starts with 9/11 and the perpetrators and victims are formulated in a way that lacks historical connections. Using the ideas of Hebdige (1993) and Dunmire (2007) , Bush 'claims a future'. (According to Hebdige, 'particular discursive strategies open up or close down particular lines of possibility ' [1993: 275] .) The means of claiming a future here is, however, twofold -disconnecting the settings from history and formulating them for posterity.
Lacking in the account are the connections to history that may provide some reasons for the attacks. The 'evil acts' are instead situated in the extended present and will structure and constrain the future when they become the past. (How they will do so is another -so to speak a 'perlocutionary' -matter.) In this respect, Bush can be thought of as obliterating the aspects of the past that may help to understand the attacks (Gur-Ze'ev, 2003) . 11 As we shall see later, the absence of historical grounding is noted and raised as accountable by some of the politicians and journalists.
The method used here by Bush was noted elsewhere by Wodak and De Cillia (2007) and Wodak et al. (1990 Wodak et al. ( , 1998 , who analysed the discursive construction of 'zero hour' ('Stunde Null') in political speeches and journalistic articles presenting the post-war history of Austria. The zero hour in this context is not quite an 'absolute zero hour' -only some connections to the past are noticeably obliterated by Bush.
On 12 September, the day after the attacks, Bush developed 'his' formulation of the attacks and projected a different future. Instead of searching for the culprits and punishing them, the USA will wage a war against them and their allies. team, and we have received the latest intelligence updates. 3.
The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our 4.
country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. 5.
This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and 6.
resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack.
((6 lines omitted)) 13.
This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people 14.
everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our 15.
resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient, we 16.
will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination. 17.
This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we will win.
In this speech, the character of the perpetrators is still entailed in the attacks. The attacks are situated in the immediate present or even in the 'pure present' displayed by the present tense ('freedom and democracy are under attack', line 6) and there is no reference to the past, except to the immediate past -the attacks took place yesterday (lines 3, 13). There are, however, references to the indeterminate future in lines 5 and 14-17. These references project the normative character of the future -there should be unity against the unknown enemy, and focus on conquering the enemy. History then, so to speak, started yesterday and the future will be conditioned by this history formulated in the speech. Somewhat paradoxically, dissociating the attacks from history is doing history -obliterating aspects, the past clears the ground for 'historical moments' and its consequences. Being a practical historian may involve making accountable connections between something in the present and something in the past, uniting the two in a figureground relationship (in the sense introduced by Gestalt psychologists). But it can also involve denying historical connections: if one is successful at obliterating elements of the past then something in that past ceases to be consequential and something else can take its place. There is, however, a difference between the two speeches. In Extract 2 Bush extends the meaning of the attacks in a significant way. On 11 September, the attacks were on America and localized geographically, socially and politically; on 12 September, however, their significance changes -they are still attacks on the USA but in addition they have become attacks on 'all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world' (lines [13] [14] . Bush transforms the meaning of the attacks by extending the incumbency of the 'victim' membership category -this varies from direct physical victims, to the USA, to (roughly) all the democrats in the world.
So the settings of the attacks developed in Bush's first two speeches following the attacks are constructed primarily in terms of intentional and moral ascriptions and include future activity projections, but lack retrospective thematic connections. This practical historical work is not idiosyncratic to Bush. His political ally in the events, Tony Blair, likewise obliterates the past relevant to 9/11, if less radically than Bush. 3: Blair, press conference, Downing Street, 11 September 2001 011.
Extract
As for those that carried out these 012.
attacks, there are no adequate words of 013.
condemnation. Their barbarism will 014.
stand as their shame for all eternity. 015.
As I said earlier, this mass terrorism is 016.
the new evil in our world.
As in George Bush's speeches, Blair does not situate the attacks historically as consequences of something done in the past; instead the attacks are formulated as antecedents of something that will happen. Presumably, the aim is that people will look back and see these attacks as Blair had formulated them in lines 13-14. Blair tries to accomplish this by marking his formulation as permanent ('for all eternity', line 14). Even more explicitly than in Bush's statement, history starts now with the attacks (lines [15] [16] . One aspect of the projected future is the continuing abhorrence of the attacks. Blair characterizes the attackers using the predicates 'barbarism' and 'evil'. In his account, these are not attributions of unchanging qualities -they are historically situated, both prospectively and retrospectively. In some contexts, the word 'barbarism' may evoke the uncivilized past but Blair uses it for the construction of a future history. There is, however, a clear historical link: Blair characterizes the 'evil' as 'new', contrasting it to something in the past but leaving the comparator vague. He uses the vague past to upgrade the seriousness of the contemporary terrorism. So the formulation of attacks and agents presupposed in them is historically situated -but only minimally so.
Three days later, Blair introduces two retrospective details into his formulation of the settings of the attacks.
Extract 4: Blair, Hansard, column 604, 14 September 2001 124.
Terrorism has taken on a new and frightening aspect. The people perpetrating it wear 125. the ultimate badge of the fanatic: they are prepared to commit suicide in pursuit of 126.
their beliefs. Our beliefs are the very opposite of theirs. We believe in reason, 127.
democracy and tolerance. These beliefs are the foundation of our civilised world. 128.
They are enduring, they have served us well, and as history has shown, we have been 129. prepared to fight, when necessary, to defend them.
The suicidal fanaticism of the attackers is again presented as something new (lines 124-6).
The terrorism now is compared to terrorism before and this comparison amplifies the seriousness of the attacks. 'Our beliefs', however, are represented as enduring and the readiness to defend them is warranted by reference to unspecified precedents (lines 128-9) . This contrast implies a future of increased and possibly increasing danger and enduring determination to defend ourselves. What strikes us as significant is that the historical particulars introduced by Blair in Extracts 3 and 4 are vague and almost altogether tacit, mere pointers to background presuppositions. This recalls Levi-Strauss's characterizations of histories as myths (see Lévi-Strauss, 1966: Ch. 9) . Documenting or detailing either the 'old' terrorism or precedents of courage in face of adversity are not a part of what Blair does -he presupposes historical knowledge. Yet the vague pointers to history are used in rhetorically definite ways -to upgrade the danger and to warrant our will to defend ourselves.
So we can see affinities but also divergences in Bush and Blair's methods of situating the attacks. Both avoid providing historical particulars that might explain the attacks. Their common historical work consists in formulating the attacks as a 'historical moment' that changes the world -the future starts here and now and its nature is cultivated through their formulations of the attacks and their settings. The future is dominated by the conflict, by what becomes the 'war on terror'. Unlike Bush, Blair constructs settings for the attacks that include historical connections and these are used for local rhetorical purposes. These historical links are, however, vague and not used to account for the attacks.
Not considering historical antecedents of the attacks is not an involuntary omission. In the press conference one day after the attacks, Blair denied the pertinence of historical connections and re-asserted his formulation of the conflict (see lines 7 and 8 below).
Extract 5: Blair, press conference, Downing Street, 12 September 2001

1.
Q: Noting what you said about Britain's Muslims, it is nonetheless the case isn't 2.
it that this international terrorism over the past decade has had a common thread of 3.
Islamic Fundamentalism and isn't it rather inadequate to try and address this problem by 4.
treating it as evil terrorism and (sic) isolation and looking at the functionalities of 5.
where the money comes from without looking at the basic clash of ideologies and indeed 6.
the basic concept of what human rights and the value of human life is? 7.
A: Of course it is evil terrorism and we shouldn't disguise that for a 8. moment but I think you are right in saying that we also have to make it clear and this 9.
is done best indeed by voices within the Muslim community and the Islamic faith 10.
that such acts of wickedness and terrorism are wholly contrary to the proper 11.
principles of the Islamic faith. And one of the reasons I mentioned the statement 12.
of the Muslim Council of Britain was in order to underscore the shock 13.
and the sense of horror and sense of outrage felt by the vast majority of 14.
Muslims round the world. So this is not a situation in which we should 15.
see this as a cause between the Muslim faith and the world but between 16.
terrorism and the rest of the world, including the Muslim faith.
The journalist challenged the account provided by Blair and pointed to a need for historical and political explanations (lines [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . In asking the question, the journalist implied that taking history on board is not optional and avoiding it in these circumstances is notable. Blair, however, insists on his initial formulation (line 7). Here, the disconnection from the past by ruling it irrelevant is explicit and blunt. Blair is consistent in his reluctance to situate the attacks in history. In fact, in his speech to the British Parliament, he declared the broader connections of the attacks to be irrelevant.
British Muslim representatives
Let us turn to the contributions of Muslim representatives. As we showed elsewhere (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2007) , the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) had an important role to play in the UK debates following the 9/11 attacks. only add to the devastation caused.
As in Bush and Blair's accounts, the attacks are presented as a turning point. The future that it indicates is, however, different from that claimed in Bush and Blair's accounts -it possibly includes attacks on British Muslims. 14 The 9/11 attacks are, therefore, formulated by MCB so as to forestall such attacks. The MCB characterizes the attacks as attacks on British Muslims too and states that the attacks will engender a response but that response should be of the right kind, not a 'knee-jerk reaction' (line 32). The attacks are to be formulated in such a way so that in the future they cannot become a historical reason warranting victimization of British Muslims. This is a general concern. The Muslim News collects statements by several Muslim groups (lines 36-8 below). It highlights a commonality -all the Muslim organizations project a possible future in which innocent Muslims are held responsible for the attacks, and the attacks become reasons for victimization. The Muslim News strengthens this projection by providing a concrete historical precedent for the possible backlash -the 1995 Oklahoma bombing (line 41). The projection of the future is warranted by introducing a historical detail. The knowledge of that historical precedent is, however, again presupposed. So all participants we have considered thus far used a common historicizing method. They formulated the attacks knowing that formulations might propagate into the future where they might afford particular actions. The actual formulations of course differed, as did the actions they might afford. Those by Bush and Blair formulated the attacks as an atrocity affording the war on terror in the future. British Muslims, on the other hand, formulated the attacks so as to prevent a future backlash against Muslims in general. 16 All the accounts then have a prospective historical dimension: the attacks are presented as something that will sometime in the future become a reason for acting in a particular way or that will constrain actions. This is a method very much like that noted by Lynch and Bogen (1996) in their analysis of the Iran/Contra affair. They observed that the Irangate/Contra conspirators acted accountably so as to establish plausible deniability in the future.
We have, however, also seen that the lack of historical accounts of the attacks could be seen as an omission (see Extract 5) . Mohammad Sarwar, the only Muslim MP at the time, was another participant who provided the beginning of an historical account.
Extract 8: Mohammad Sarwar, Hansard, column 634, 14 September 2001
09.
There can be no justification for 10.
this vulgar terrorist 11.
atrocity, but we cannot be blind to the 12.
plight of oppressed people who look to 13.
Europe and the USA for support. As a 14.
former colonial power we have a 15. special responsibility.
Sarwar calls for an account of the attacks in terms of historical antecedents. He introduces one class of such antecedents into the setting of the attacks: the British colonial past (line 14) and oppression (line 12). Moreover, he represents ignoring the historical antecedents of the attacks as 'blindness' -like the journalist in Extract 5, but more strongly -he implies that historical understanding in these circumstances is obligatory rather than optional -so leaving out historical elements is implicitly presented as a failure on Bush and Blair's part. The historical antecedents in Sarwar's account are, however, again only very roughly sketched out -he connects the attacks to the colonial past and to oppression without giving any detail. So again, historical grounding in political talk is achieved not through extended elaboration but by means of pointers to vague shared background historical knowledge. Sarwar's rejection of the attacks is nevertheless absolute -he introduces historical links carefully so that it cannot be understood that he is excusing the attacks (lines [9] [10] [11] . Despite the vagueness, the historical contextualization explains, but does not justify, the attacks. His introduction of historical particulars into settings is instrumentally focused.
Osama bin Laden
So, in the first days following the 9/11 attacks, Bush and Blair avoided situating the attacks in history and this was noted as an accountable absence by journalists and British Muslims. Osama bin Laden, however, focused on situating the attacks in a historically extended, ongoing conflict. The following extract is from the first publicly available statement by Bin Laden following the 9/11 attacks. 17 Here, Bin Laden does not actually refer to the 9/11 attacks -but the sequential proximity of the statement to the attacks made it relevant to journalists and readers. To our Muslim brothers in Pakistan, peace be upon you. 2.
I have received with great sadness the news that some of our Muslim brothers have 3.
been killed in Karachi while expressing their denouncement of the forces of the 4.
American crusade and their allies in the Muslim lands of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 5.
We ask God to receive them as martyrs and may they become like the prophets, the 6.
believers and good people who were chosen to become God's companions, and may 7.
God grant their relatives patience and solace and bless their sons with good fortune 8.
and reward them greatly for their faith in Islam. 9.
And for those martyrs who left behind children, those children will be mine and I 10.
will be their guardian with the blessing of God.
Bin Laden formulates the general nature of the conflict as between Islam and other religions hostile to Islam, and it has some considerable history. He starts his statement by presenting the deaths of 'Muslim brothers' in Pakistan. It is not clear whether they were killed in suicide attacks or in demonstrations. Whatever the case, Bin Laden formulates the activity as 'expressing denouncement', but a denouncement of what? Of a crusade against Islam by Americans and their allies? The formulation ties the conflict to history. This is accomplished through the choice of terms to formulate the attacks and the participants. The terms that Osama bin Laden uses indicate that the conflict has a historical character; in particular, his repeated use of 'crusade' (line 4 above, and lines 16, 17, 20 below) points to the medieval conflict between Christians and Muslims. 18 Other words used in formulating the attackers also indicate the historical nature of the conflict -they are 'martyrs' (lines 5, 9, 15) and 'prophets' (line 5). These terms, of course, also invoke the religious nature of the conflict -the setting contains both religious and historical particulars which are coordinated. Importantly, this is not the only way in which Bin Laden historicizes the conflict in Pakistan. He also does it through explicitly indexing relevant historical antecedents. It is not surprising for the Islamic nation to rise up in Pakistan in defence of Islam. 12.
Pakistan is considered to be the first line of the defence of Islam in the region as was 13.
the case with Afghanistan in defending itself and Pakistan against the Russian 14.
invasion more than 20 years ago. And we would hope that these brothers will be 15.
among the first martyrs in the battle of 16.
Islam in this era against the new Christian-Jewish crusade that is led by the chief 17.
crusader Bush under the banner of the cross.
18.
This battle is considered one of the glorious Islamic battles.
19.
We incite our Muslim brothers in Pakistan to strive with all they possess and all they 20.
are able to against the American crusading forces to prevent them invading Pakistan 21.
and Afghanistan.
Bin Laden characterizes 'the uprising' as a continuing defence of Islam (see lines [11] [12] [13] [14] . Contrary to Bush and Blair, the conflict is not something new. Bin Laden aligns the 'uprising' with other 'acts of defence' in the past, singling out the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The conflict is to be understood as a part of the continuing defence of Islam against Christianity. Under this formulation, the 9/11 attacks cannot be understood as something new and suicide attacks are to be understood as a justified defence of Islam against ongoing aggression. Like Bush and Blair, Bin Laden projects a future on the basis of his formulation of the conflict. The future consists of a battle with the crusader forces attacking Islam. This is what the West can expect from him on the basis of his formulations. What is the future that he offers his 'Muslim brothers'? Martyrdom with a subsequent elevated religious status (Extract 9, lines 5-8; see also Extract 12, line 23) and, in the case of the martyrs, care for their orphans (Extract 9, lines 9-10).
The next statement Bin Laden made was broadcast on 7 October 2001 where he did refer to the 9/11 attacks and formulate them consistently with how he characterized the conflict in general.
Extract 11: Bin Laden, Al Jazeera, 7 October 2001
((eight lines omitted)) 9.
God Almighty hit the United States at its most vulnerable spot. He destroyed its 10.
greatest buildings. 11.
Praise be to God. 12.
Here is the United States. It was filled with terror from its north to its south and from 13.
its east to its west. 14.
Praise be to God.
15.
What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to what we have 16.
tasted for tens of years. 17.
Our nation has been tasting this humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years. 18.
Its sons are being killed, its blood is being shed, its holy places are being attacked, 19.
and it is not being ruled according to what God has decreed. 20.
Despite this, nobody cares. 21.
When Almighty God rendered successful a convoy of Muslims, the vanguards of 22.
Islam, He allowed them to destroy the United States.
Bin Laden justifies and welcomes the attacks. This is done through extreme case formulation which upgrades their effects (lines 12-13) and through attributing the agency in the attacks to god and praising him. Then, however, the attacks are situated historically. Bin Laden does this by relating them to what 'his nation' has suffered for an extended period (lines [15] [16] who is capable to do so. 25.
When these defended their oppressed sons, brothers, and sisters in Palestine and in 26.
many Islamic countries, the world at large shouted. The infidels shouted, followed by 27. the hypocrites. 28.
One million Iraqi children have thus far died in Iraq although they did not do 29.
anything wrong. 30.
Despite this, we heard no denunciation by anyone in the world or a fatwa by the 31.
rulers' ulema. 32.
Israeli tanks and tracked vehicles also enter to wreak havoc in Palestine, in Jenin, 33.
Ramallah, Rafah, Beit Jala, and other Islamic areas and we hear no voices raised or 34. moves made.
35.
But if the sword falls on the United States after 80 years, hypocrisy raises its head 36.
lamenting the deaths of these killers who tampered with the blood, honour, and holy 37.
places of the Muslims. 38.
The least that one can describe these people is that they are morally depraved. 39.
They champion falsehood, support the butcher against the victim, the oppressor 40.
against the innocent child. 41.
May God mete them the punishment they deserve. 42.
I say that the matter is clear and explicit. 43.
In the aftermath of this event and now that senior US officials have spoken, 44.
beginning with Bush, the head of the world's infidels, and whoever supports him, 45.
every Muslim should rush to defend his religion.
Bin Laden moreover presents the 9/11 attacks again as defence, this time of the oppressed people in Palestine and in many Islamic countries (lines 25-6). In the example of Iraq (line 28), he characterizes the present situation in the 'Islamic areas' as something that connects clearly to the past, that emerges as a result of the past -his use of 'thus far' (line 28) implies that the terror experienced by the people in the Islamic areas started some time ago and continues. Note also that he clearly identifies some of the perpetrators of the terror there -'Israeli tanks and tracked vehicles' (line 32). So in providing the historical antecedents of the 9/11 attacks, he contextualizes them relative to attacks on Muslims that happened a long time ago, that happened more recently and still are happening. He compares the consequences of what follows the 9/11 attacks in America with what has been happening in the Muslim world (he uses 'nation', Extract 11, line 17) 'for more than 80 years' (Extract 11, line 17) . This practical historical work allows him to shift the membership category of the 9/11 agents -from being perpetrators of outrage, they become fighters on behalf of innocent victims and possible martyrs. As noted by Lawrence (2005: xviii) , Bin Laden practises a 'reactive terror -a response to what he perceives as the much greater terror exercised by the West over an incomparably longer period of time'. Yet Bin Laden does not act as a 'lay historian' -he does not detail the medieval crusades (cf. Burrow, 2009) or Israeli involvement in the extended conflict; instead as a 'practical historian', in and through his activities, he presupposes and invokes background historical knowledge.
The history created in Bin Laden's speeches is different from that created by Bush and Blair, for whom history seems to begin with the 9/11 attacks. For Bin Laden, the attacks are a historical continuation of an ongoing conflict. By making history start with the attacks, Bush and Blair attempt to make much of the 'past history' irrelevant. Their history starts with the attacks.
Conclusion -practical historians and structured immediacy
We introduced 'structured immediacy' as a concept to orient analysts to how contexts removed from the here-and-now are made immediate in occasions by being actualized in and through participants' actions. The concept was formulated in contradiction to the intellectualized view in which the immersion in the occasion is something primitive and to be overcome. It was also designed to move studies of social interaction beyond actioncontext dualism. We rejected the view that 'here-and-now' is a primitive sensory experience. Here-and-now is indexical and structured by a specific design, through participants' activities both individually and collaboratively.
In the materials analysed above, the attacks and their perpetrators were understood under varied descriptions through being connected by participants to wider but differing ranges of historical circumstances. We identified two related practices of doing history work in the political discourse that we examined. One was to situate contemporary activities historically by introducing historical particulars into settings. Such particulars were typically pointers to something vague in the past. And the past so indicated was not critically examined in the talk -the participants introduced the past into the present but didn't turn away from the present towards the past. The historical knowledge was instead presupposed -myth-like, we thought. The introduced particulars, however, did not just provide links to a tenuous history. They were used in discrete and specific ways in the local talk: sometimes as comparators to upgrade or downgrade the seriousness of contemporary events; sometimes as precedents that made certain futures easier to imagine; and sometimes to subsume current actions and participants in collections of categories. Historical particulars were thus used to 'thicken' the descriptions of people and activities -providing them with meanings they would not have had otherwise -i.e. to thicken the descriptions of attacks and their consequences (Ryle, 1968) . These methods of historicizing consisted in situating and connecting present events to events in the past through weaving historical particulars into the settings -a kind of structured immediacy described by Leudar et al. (2008b) . In the materials we analysed above, historicizing was done to accomplish many things -to upgrade the seriousness of attacks, to downgrade it, to indicate how the attacks might be explained (if not justi-fied). One thing was noticeable -the antagonists tied the 9/11 attacks to history in different ways, thus giving them a different significance. One noticeable strategy was disconnecting happenings from history instead of historicizing them. The contemporary event changed everything, creating a break in history (Burrow, 2009 ). In the instance of 9/11, such historical disconnections were understood by some participants as omissions -something should have been argued but was not. This means that, in some circumstances, indicating historical connections of the present happenings is not optional but obligatory.
The second practice of doing history was complementary. It consisted in controlling ('claiming') future history by fixing meanings of current events in which the actors participated through formulations. This strategy often, but not always, involved obliterating the past and claiming that history started with significant contemporary events. In our view, historical accounting is an important source of meaning. One can make use of narratives which are already available or it can be managed prospectively -historicizing can be anticipatory and that is where past and future meet.
So historicizing is a Janus-like method: one element of it is to situate a current event relative to selected historical antecedents; another to constrain the historical particulars available to situate the future events. Just the right past will be available to situate the events in the future (for example, war on terror, continuing jihad, blaming the Muslims or not blaming them).
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But what about our supplementary aim: thinking about our analyses as historical objects? What has changed since our first analysis of the same speeches? We now know in detail what the war on terror consisted of, and its results so far. We know how Bush's and Blair's policy developed, but none of this matters in the analysis of how participants formulated what happened in the first two days after the attacks and subsequently. The analysis cannot be anachronistic and has to use the information available at the time if we are to understand the participants and the conflict. Nevertheless, the reanalysis of the texts revealed some aspects of the speeches and an element of their coordination that we missed the first time. Does this make our original analysis into a historical object? The second analysis is different from our initial one, but not because the speeches are now seen in a different field of particulars because we supplemented what we had known at the time by what has since happened and has been revealed. The difference in the analysis is due to our shift in interest. The features we now uncovered were always there -but not for us as we were then. Now they are foregrounded relative to our shifted interests. But this of course is also a historicity -so we both satisfied 'unique adequacy requirement' (analysed the text in terms of background assumptions appropriate to the time; cf. Garfinkel, 2002) but focused on different aspects appropriate to our changing interests. So the re-analysis tells us about ourselves and how we change. But, in examining the speeches with shifted interest, it also tells us things about the speeches that we did not, or possibly could not, notice at the time. This is precisely what Collingwood said about re-enactment -re-enactment stretches the historian and in doing re-enactments we learn our own limits. And as we extend our limits, we learn new things about the historical materials that we are working with. Here, the shift in our interests revealed important aspects of how enemies use and produce history in formulating conflict.
The Muslim News is a monthly, and the issue of 28 September 2001 we use here was the first issue after 9/11. 16. We have shown elsewhere (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2007) that Blair cooperated with representatives of British Muslims in order to ensure that in the future British Muslims would not be blamed for the attacks. 17. Originally, we used the English translation from the BBC website. Now we have also consulted the translation prepared at the time for the Associate Press. There are many translations of Bin Laden's statements. The analysts need to use versions that were read, discussed and referred to at the time. For that reason, we did not employ later translations, though they might be of better quality, such as those included in Lawrence (2005) . 18. A leading Czech specialist in Arabic studies, L. Kropáček (2002: 31) claims that 'in Arabic political rhetoric the references to the crusaders can occur either as an expression of mistrust towards the West or as an historical reminder of the transience of the foreign entity planted in the Arab-Muslim world'. Bush used this word soon after the attacks, when formulating possible US reprisals for the attacks; subsequently he avoided the term. 19. Bin Laden may have alluded to the new political arrangement of the Arabic Peninsula carried out particularly by Britain and France after the First World War. This was contrary to the expectations of and promises given to the Arab elites, and brought out abiding regional conflicts (for more details, see Lawrence, 2005) . 20. Of course, we are not saying that these are the only ways of doing history (even in political talk). For instance, the strategy of retrospectively changing the meaning of actions in the past was not present in our materials. 21. This research was partly supported by grant no. P404/10/0790 from the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, and the grant MSM 0021620825 awarded by the Czech Ministry of Education.
